We extend the class of quality-ladder growth models (Grossman and Helpman, 1991, Segerstrom, 1998 and others), to encompass an economy with asymmetric fundamentals. In contrast to the standard framework, in our model industries may differ in terms of their innovative potential (quality jumps and arrival rates) and consumers' preferences. This extension allows us to bring industrial policy back into the realm of the growth policy debate. We first show that it is always possible to raise the long-run growth rate and the social welfare of the economy through a costless tax/subsidy scheme reallocating resources towards the relatively more promising industries. We then prove that, in certain economies, even a mere profit taxation policy increases economic growth and social welfare above the laissez-faire.
Introduction
for this market failure is related to the forward-looking nature of the agents' R&D investment decisions across industries. The amount of future investment that agents expect in each industry adversely a¤ects their expected duration of the monopolistic position acquired through innovation, and hence their current investment decisions (a creative destruction e¤ect). In equilibrium, agents tend to expect relatively high (low) levels of future R&D investments in relatively 'g o o d ' ( 'b a d ') industries. Since from a social perspective the expected duration of the monopoly does not play any role, agents allocate investments sub-optimally across industries by investing too little in 'g o o d ' i n d u s t r i e s and too much in 'b a d ' industries. The sub-optimal allocation of resources calls for a sensible industrial policy capable of inducing a redistribution of these resources from 'b a d ' i n d u s t r i e s to 'g o o d ' i n d u s t r i e s .
In particular, in a slightly simpli…ed version of our model -in which only di¤erences in quality jumps across industries are assumed -we carry out two policy exercises. In the …r s t we compare the e¤ects on the steady state growth rate of the economy and on social welfare of two di¤erent tax/subsidy schemes on pro…ts. A 's y m m e t r i c ' r u l e , under which all industries are equally taxed/subsidized, and an 'a s y m m e t r i c ' r u l e , under which industries are taxed or subsidized according to their speci…c quality jump (the higher the quality jump, the lower the tax or the higher the subsidy). Keeping equal the amount of public revenue/expenditure under the two rules, our result is that the steady state growth rate associated with the 'a s y m m e t r i c ' r u l e is unambiguously higher than that associated with the 's y m m e t r i c ' r u l e . Moreover, since the total amount of consumption in equilibrium turns out to be the same under the two rules, the 'a s y m m e t r i c ' r u l e is also welfare-enhancing with respect to the 's y m m e t r i c ' rule. An important corollary of this result is that a zero-cost industrial policy, which simply redistributes resources from 'b a d ' industries to 'g o o d ' i n d u s t r i e s while leaving the public budget balanced, unambiguously increases both economic growth and welfare above the laissez-faire equilibrium. Hence, whatever the optimal amount of R&D expenditure, an industrial policy relatively favoring the more promising industries is worth implementing.
In the second policy exercise we assume that the policy maker is only allowed to tax but not to subsidize across industries. We prove that, if the di¤erence between 'g o o d ' a n d 'b a d ' i n d u s t r i e s is 'b i g enough', even a mere taxation policy -which only taxes 'b a d ' i n d u s t r i e s without subsidizing the 'g o o d ' ones -is capable of enhancing both economic growth and social welfare. This 'p a r a d o x of growth' -that is, the fact that taxation on R&D returns fosters growth -arises because taxation frees up resources from the 'b a d ' i n d u s t r i e s , which the market allocates partly to manufacture (so that …n a l consumption unambiguously increases) and partly to the 'g o o d ' industries. If the set of 'g o o d ' i n d u s t r i e s is su¢ ciently more productive than the set of 'b a d ' i n d u stries which are being taxed, the gain in productivity for the economy more than o¤sets the loss due to the decrease in the overall amount of resources devoted to R&D (which parallels the increase in consumption). This result is reminiscent of Segerstrom's (2000) discussion of the long-run growth e¤ects of R&D subsidies. In Section 3.2 we draw a comparison between his and our model.
The policies mentioned above are all welfare-enhancing. The welfaremaximizing solution is found in Section 4 where we show that, given the asymmetric structure of the economy, it is socially optimal to concentrate the total amount of R&D investment in the one most pro…table industry and leave the other industries to stagnate forever. The corresponding optimal policy would then be to turn o¤ (through taxation with tax rates equal to one) all industries but the best one and then, as usual in quality-ladder models, to tax or subsidize the latter depending on the parameters of the model. It is worth remarking however that, while in the model the preference and technological characteristics are time-invariant and perfectly known by the policy maker, in reality that is most probably not the case. We thus …n d this policy option too risky to be implemented.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we develop the model, analyze its steady state properties and draw the main comparative statics results. In Section 3 we carry out the policy analysis. In Section 4 we develop the welfare analysis, while in Section 5 we conclude with some remarks.
The Model
Let us assume a continuum of industries producing …n a l goods indexed by ! 2 [0; 1]. In each industry …r m s are distinguished by the quality index j of the goods they supply, with the quality of their goods being increasing in the integer j. At time t = 0 in each industry some …r m knows how to produce a j = 0 quality product and no other …r m can o¤er a better one. In order to develop higher quality versions of any product …r m s engage in R&D races. The winner of an R&D race becomes the sole producer of a good whose quality is one step ahead of the previous quality leader.
Households
We assume a …x e d number of dynastic households (normalized to one) whose members grow at constant rate n > 0. Each member shares the same intertemporally additively separable utility log u(t) and is endowed with a unit of labor she supplies inelastically. Therefore each household chooses its optimal consumption path by maximizing the discounted utility
where L(0) 1 is the initial population and > n is the common rate of time preferences.
The instantaneous utility function is a logarithmic Cobb-Douglas. We let the utility weights ( (!)) vary across industries, so as to represent a possible heterogeneity of consumers preferences among the set of commodities. As the (!)'s represent the relative weights of the goods in the utility function, we can normalize them in such a way that
If we de…ne (!) as the size of quality improvements (the so-called 'q u a l i t y jump'), assumed to be industry-speci…c to allow for asymmetry in the technical evolution of each line, j max (!; t) as the highest quality reached by product ! at time t, and d(j; !; t) as the consumption of product ! of quality j at time t, then the instantaneous utility function can be written as
and the static maximization problem can be represented as
where p(j; !; t) denotes the price of product ! of quality j at time t and C(t) is the total expenditure at time t.
At each point in time consumers maximize static utility by spreading their expenditure across industries proportionally to the utility contribution of each product line ( (!)). Since they perceive vertically di¤erentiated products in a given industry ! as perfect substitutes once adjusted for quality di¤erences, they will purchase in each product line those products with the lowest price per unity of quality. As we will see in the next subsection, in each product line the j max (!; t) quality product is the unique good with the minimum price-quality ratio. Hence, the individual static demand functions are
Substituting (4) into (2) and (2) into (1), we state the intertemporal maximum problem as
where r(s) is the instantaneous interest rate at time s and W (0) is the present value of the stream of incomes plus the value of initial wealth at time t = 0. The solution to this problem obeys the di¤erential equation
Manufacture
Each good is produced by employing labor through a constant returns to scale technology. In order to produce one unit of any good …r m s hire l m units of labor regardless of quality.
In each industry the j max (!; t) quality product can only be manufactured by the …r m owning the blueprint. As usual, since …r m s engage in Bertrand competition, the quality leader monopolizes its relative market until a successive innovation is introduced in its product line. Indeed, having a quality advantage over its competitors, it can charge a price higher than its unit cost, with the quality-adjusted price being still "-lower than those of its followers. Moreover, because of the 'A r r o w e¤ect', the quality leader does not engage in R&D races (see Grossman and Helpman 1991, p. 47) . Hence, it is always one step ahead of its immediate follower, and the limit price that still monopolizes the market is (!)w(t)l m where w(t) is the wage rate set equal to 1
1 . Given the individual demand functions d(j; !; t); the market demand of good ! at time
. Its unit elastic structure makes the quality leader exactly set the limit price (see Grossman and Helpman 1991, p. 46) . Then
We can now calculate the pro…t ‡o w in each industry as
R&D Races
The research sector is characterized by the e¤orts of R&D …r m s to develop better versions of the existing products in order to displace the current monopolists. We assume free entry and perfect competition in each R&D race. Firms employ labor and produce, through a constant returns technology, a Poisson arrival rate of innovation in the product line they target. In this sector we depart from the standard framework by allowing for di¤erent arrival rates across industries. With this adjustment we intend to formally introduce into the analysis the possibility that some industries are more promising than others in terms of their chances of discovering a new commodity. Any …r m hiring l u units of labor in industry ! at time t acquires the instantaneous probability of innovating of A(!)l u =X(!; t), where X(!; t) is the R&D di¢ culty index.
Since independent Poisson processes are additive, the speci…cation of the innovation process implies that the industry-wide instantaneous probability of innovation (or research intensity) is
where L I (!; t) = P u l u (!; t). The R&D di¢ culty index X(!; t) describes the evolution of technology. It is assumed to increase over time in order to rule out the 's c a l e e¤ect' (Jones, 1995) , that is, to allow for constant growth rates even with a growing population. In what follows we will assume it to evolve in accordance with the speci…cation suggested by Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999) 2 . This formulation has been developed to formalize the increasing dif…c u l ty of introducing new products in more crowded markets
where k is a positive constant. Whenever a …r m succeeds in innovating, it acquires the uncertain pro…t ‡o w that accrues to a monopolist, that is, the stock market valuation of the …r m . Let us denote it by v(!; t). Thus, the problem faced by an R&D …r m is that of choosing the amount of labor input in order to maximize its expected pro…ts
which provides a …n i t e , positive solution for l u only when the arbitrage equation
is satis…ed. Notice that in this case, though …n i t e , the size of the R&D …r m is indeterminate because of the constant returns research technology.
Households own the monopolistic …r m s through an e¢ cient stock market. In equilibrium the stock market valuation of these …r m s yields an expected rate of return equal to the riskless interest rate r(t). This equality must hold because the presence of a perfectly e¢ cient …n a n c i a l market allows risk-averse households to completely diversify their portfolio across industries and, hence, to care only about deterministic mean returns. The representative shareholder receives a dividend of (!; t)dt over a time interval of length dt, and the value of the monopoly appreciates by v(!; t)dt if no …r m innovates in the unit of time dt. However, if an innovation occurs, which happens with probability i(!; t)dt, the shareholder su¤ers a loss of v(!; t). Therefore, the expected rate of return from holding a share of a monopolistic …r m per unit of time is
which needs be equal to the interest rate r(t). From that equality we can derive the …r m 's market valuation as
so that the R&D equilibrium condition is
The Labor Market
Since in each industry the market demand D(!; t) = (!)C(t)L(t)= (!)l m requires D(!; t)l m units of labor in order to be produced, the total employment in the manufacturing sector is
Then, the labor market-clearing condition implies
where
! is the total employment in the research sector.
Balanced Growth Path
We now focus on the balanced state growth path where the endogenous variables all grow at constant rates. The steady state requires that the distribution of resources between manufacturing and research be constant. In turn, _ C(t)=C(t) = 0, and from the Euler equation we have r(t) = : Moreover, from the de…nition of v(!; t) it follows that its steady state growth rate is v(!; t)=v(!; t) = n: The arbitrage equation (7) then becomes
The rational expectations equilibrium requires that expectations on research intensities be equal to their actual values. Moreover, as our model assumes increasing complexity, the steady state analysis makes these intensities constant over time. From (7) we determine the following expression for them
Notice that the probabilities of innovation i (!) in steady state are a¢ ne transformations of industry-speci…c pro…ts and research technologies. If we de…ne the sectoral population-adjusted research employment as l I (!; t) L I (!; t)=L(t), from the de…nition of the research intensity it follows that l I (!) = i(!)X(!; t)=L(t)A(!). Then, by plugging the expression for i(!) given above, we obtain
The population-adjusted steady-state resource condition is given by
The two equations (9) and (10) de…ne the steady state values of per-capita expenditure C and of the population-adjusted research employment in each industry l I (!). Using (9) to substitute for l I (!) into (10), we obtain the steady state value for C
Plugging the expression above into (9) we then determine the steady state value for l I (!)
As expected, the research e¤orts in the steady state equilibrium are now industry-speci…c. Comparative statics analysis con…rms the standard results obtained in symmetric quality-ladder models. In each industry the populationadjusted research e¤ort is an increasing function of the quality jump, the utility weight and the arrival rate. The total amount of research is negatively correlated with the rate of time preferences and positively correlated with the population growth rate 3 . Finally, given that i(!) A(!)L(t)l I (!)=X(!; t), we can immediately …n d the steady-state values for the research intensites as
Since the growth rate of individual utility can be thought of as the measure of the economy's growth rate, we now solve for its steady state value. Substituting for p(j; !; t) = (!)l m and C(t) = C, the steady state value of the utility is
Given that 3 See Appendix A for a brief derivation of these results.
represents the expected number of successes in industry ! up to time t), di¤erentiating log u(t) with respect to time yields
To sum up, the steady state equilibrium is characterized by a set of constant prices p(j; !; t) = (!)l m ; w(t) = 1; r(t) = ; and constant per capita quantities. In particular, total expenditure is
sectoral production is
while sectoral investment in R&D is
Utility is the only per capita variable growing in steady state. Since growth in utility is a linear function of research intensities, in the next section we investigate how industrial policy can a¤ect the economy's growth and welfare by in ‡uencing the distribution of investments in R&D.
The Role of Industrial Policy in Enhancing
Economic Performance and Social We l f a r e
Market equilibrium of quality-ladder growth models is not optimal. The existence of the well-known distortionary e¤ects, namely the 'c o n s u m e r surplus e¤ect', the 'i n t e r t e m p o r a l spillover' and the 'b u s i n n e s s stealing e¤ect', (see Grossman and Helpman 1991, p. 52) makes it necessary to introduce either a tax or subsidy (depending on the values of the parameters and on the model speci…cations) to induce the welfare-maximizing R&D expenditure 4 . The asymmetric structure of our economy brings an additional failure of the market forces in delivering the social welfare optimum. The total amount of resources devoted to R&D (whether optimal or not) is ine¢ ciently distributed across industries. The source of this industry-speci…c sub-optimality is still associated with the 'i n t e r t e m p o r a l spillover'. As is well known, the forwardlooking nature of the market equilibrium makes the arrival of the next innovation in every industry exercise a negative e¤ect on the market value of the incumbent -because of its 'c r e a t i v e destruction' e¤ect. As a result, in our asymmetric economy higher R&D e¤orts in the relatively more pro…table industries generate higher creative destruction in those industries, thus lowering their expected returns. However, from a social perspective the expected duration of the monopolistic position acquired by an innovation is irrelevant, and the arrival of the successive innovation enhances consumer welfare unambiguously. Hence, pursuing industries with higher utility more intensively improves overall welfare. Our asymmetric policies go in this direction by switching the incentive to invest from the least to the most pro…table industries.
The argument is developed along two lines. In the next subsection we show that, under the same public budget constraint, a selective policy interventionwhich favors the relatively better industries -is always unambiguously better than a uniform one for both economic growth and the agents'welfare in the steady state. As a particular case of this reasoning we also compare the laissezfaire solution with a costless asymmetric policy rule which, by taxing some industries and subsidizing others, is such that the whole tax revenue (or subsidy expenditure) is zero. This asymmetric rule increases the growth rate and the overall welfare of the economy above laissez-faire. In Subsection 3.2 we …n d that, under certain conditions, the same result may be obtained even through a pure taxation policy such that a subset of relatively bad industries are taxed and no subsidies are awarded.
For reasons of tractability let us consider a slightly simpli…ed version of the model developed in the last section. In this version the heterogeneity in both the utility weights ( (!)) and the technology parameters (A(!)) is removed, 4 Particular attention has been devoted to the relation between the optimal subsidy and the size of innovation. Grossman and Helpman (1991) found it to be n-shaped; in Segerstom (1998) the optimal subsidy is a monotonic negative function of the innovation size, while Li's (2003) model implies the optimal subsidy to be positive for 'l o w ' a n d 'h i g h ' l e v e l s of innovation size but not for intermediate ones.
while the quality jumps (!) are still left as industry-speci…c 5 . In other words, we are considering an economy where some industries might be more attractive for R&D investments in terms of the monopoly pro…ts they can generate once the innovation is brought into the market.
The Tax/Subs i dy Scheme
Let us introduce pro…t taxation/subsidy. Taxes (subsidies) are assumed to be transferred (withdrawn) to (from) the representative household, so that its intertemporal budget constraint remains una¤ected. We will derive our result by comparing two distinct policy rules. The …r s t rule imposes that each industry be equally taxed (subsidized), while the second requires that the tax (subsidy) rate be inversely (directly) related to its quality jump, that is, the higher the quality jump the lower the tax (the higher the subsidy). Let (!) be the industry-speci…c tax (subsidy) rate, then the two rules can formally be expressed as (a) (!) = = (1 s), (b) (!) = (1 m (!)). When s; m (!) 2 (0; 1], then (!) 2 R + and represents a tax rate. When s; m (!) 2 [1; +1), (!) 2 R and represents a subsidy rate. Our goal is to compare the di¤erent e¤ects on the economy's growth rate (and welfare) of these two rules under the constraint that the total amount of government revenue/expenditure be the same. This public budget constraint can be expressed as
where s , C s denote pro…ts and expenditure under the symmetric policy rule, while as , C as denote pro…ts and expenditure under the asymmetric policy rule.
We can now determine the steady state values for the expenditure and the research e¤ort in both cases 6 . In the presence of pro…t tax/subsidy, the agents evaluate the opportunity of investment in R&D on the basis of the after-tax (or after-subsidy) pro…t ‡o w they can gain in the case of successful innovation. Hence, the new steady state arbitrage equation under the asymmetric rule becomes
Once again notice that m (!) < 1 represents a tax, while m (!) > 1 represents a subsidy. Solving for l as I (!) we obtain
and plugging it into the new resource condition
we can derive the steady state expenditure under the asymmetric policy rule
Analogously, given that the after-tax (subsidy) steady state arbitrage equation under the symmetric rule is
and using the resource condition as before, we can solve for C s and obtain
C as and C s are functions of, among others, the two parameters m and s respectively, which measure the direction and the intensity of the government intervention. So far we have not established any relation between them, so that C as and C s are in fact incomparable. However, we know that the constraint on total tax revenue (12) must be satis…ed. We now show that, when this constraint is imposed, the relation between s and m is such that the overall expenditure is exactly the same under the two di¤erent taxation schemes (that is, C as = C s ). Plugging the expression for C as and C s just derived into (12) we can solve for s as a function of m and obtain
Substituting for s into the equilibrium value of C s , it can then be immediately veri…ed that C s = C as C. This result is not surprising. Since the government revenue/expenditure is constrained to be the same under both tax regimes, the decision on whether to invest in research or to employ resources in the manufacturing sector is not a¤ected.
The labor market-clearing condition, on the other hand, requires that the sum of per capita expenditure and of per capita aggregate research be constant. Hence, the total amount of research is also exactly the same under the two policy rules. We can …n a l l y …n d the steady state industry-speci…c research intensities under the two di¤erent policy rules (we plug (13) into the expression for i s (!) in order to render the two quantities directly comparable)
and show that the growth rate is higher under the asymmetric policy rule. In this simpli…ed version of the model the growth rate is
This depends on the research intensities and, in particular, on the e¤ect of the policy rule on the research intensities. Our reasoning now goes as follows.
First notice that, since the overall R&D e¤ort is constant, the total research intensity (
It is easy to show that
The asymmetric policy a¤ects the distribution of the intensities by reallocating resources towards industries with relatively higher quality jumps. Since the growth rate of the economy is the sum of the log of the quality jumps each weighted with the research intensity of its industry, the steady state growth rate associated with the asymmetric policy is unambiguously higher than the one associated with a symmetric policy. The underlying intuition is that heterogeneity in the quality jumps determines an asymmetric structure of pro…ts and, then, of research intensities across industries. The asymmetric rule ampli…es this e¤ect by polarizing the distribution of the R&D resources towards the industries characterized by higher quality jumps. Notice also that an increase in the steady state growth rate, coupled with an unchanged level of total expenditure C, leads to an unambiguous increase in social welfare 7 . This result contains an important corollary. If we are to suggest a certain policy (namely, an asymmetric one), we may …n d it reasonable to compare it with its 'n a t u r a l ' r e f e r e n c e point, the laissez-faire policy. This comparison is exactly what we obtain when we set s = 1 in the policy analysis we have developed above. That condition, together with (12), implies
While s = 1 identi…es the 'l a i s s e z -f a i r e policy',m (!) describes an asymmetric 'z e r o -s u m policy', that is, a policy which can only redistribute resources from one industry to another, leaving the public budget exactly balanced. Interestingly, a comparison of the research intensities across the two policy rules shows 8 that it is always possible to improve upon the laissez-faire equilibrium through a costless system of tax/subsidy which reallocates resources towards the relatively more promising indutries. By continuity, it is then possible to implement a tax/subsidy scheme which enhances economic performance as well as social welfare and, at the same time, guarantees a strictly positive tax revenue for the government. In the next subsection we go even further by showing that, in some economies, the same result may be achieved even when the policy maker is only allowed to tax, but not to subsidize, across industries.
The Pure Taxat i on Scheme
In the simpli…ed framework developed above -in which only the quality jumps are industry-speci…c -we now introduce a particular ordering of industries such that ( ) is an increasing function of the industry index !, that is, an ordering from the least to the most innovative industry as ! goes from 0 to 1. Let us partition the set of industries into two subsets, [0; !] and ( !; 1]. The suggested policy rule consists of taxing uniformly 9 the …r s t subset of (relatively less innovative) industries, while leaving the second subset of (relatively more innovative) industries una¤ected. Under the adopted notation the industryspeci…c tax rate is (!) = (1 s) 2 (0; 1) 8! 2 [0; !] and (!) = 0 8! 2 ( !; 1]. The new set of arbitrage equations is now given by
8 As a particular case of the one above, the procedure to obtain the result is straightforward after substituting form into the expressions for the equilibrium research intensities i s (!), i as (!). 9 For simplicity we consider a uniform policy instead of an asymmetric one. The latter would indeed enlarge the set of economies for which our proposition holds.
Solving for l T I (!) and plugging it into the usual resource condition we …n d the equilibrium value for expenditure to be
, the taxation policy raises expenditure above the laissez-faire. Hence, given the resource constraint, it lowers the total amount of resources employed in R&D below the laissezfaire. Furthermore, this policy has an additional e¤ect on the industry-speci…c research intensities which in equilibrium are given by
The research intensities in the subset ( !; 1] are positively a¤ected by the tax policy. The reason is that higher expenditure raises pro…ts in manufacturing, and hence raises the incentive to invest in the industries which are not directly a¤ected by the taxation. Given the resource constraint, the increase in the resources devoted to consumption and to the more innovative industries is exactly balanced by the reduction of investment in the taxed industries. Then our policy rule has two opposite e¤ects on the growth rate of utility. On the one hand, it reduces the total resources devoted to the research sector (a negative e¤ect). On the other hand, by reducing the pro…tability of investing in the less innovative industries, it favors a partial reallocation of research investment towards those industries with a higher contribution to household utility (a positive e¤ect). There exist economies where the second e¤ect more than o¤sets the …r s t e¤ect and, hence, for which a pure taxation policy increases the long-run growth rate.
Let
! respectively be the growth rates under the tax policy and under laissez-faire (where i LF (!) can be obtained from i T (!) by posing s = 1). Given (14) and (15), and since s < 1
Given that
and that R ! 0 ( (!) 1) = (!)d! < 1, the inequality may or may not hold. As expected, whether it holds or not depends 1. on the fundamentals of the economy (that is, on 'h o w much better'are industries in ( !; 1] with respect to those in [0; !] in terms of quality jumps (!)), and 2. on ! (that is, on 'h o w many' industries are taxed). The inequality above is more likely to be satis…ed the higher the di¤erence in the quality jumps between the two subsets of industries, and/or the smaller the mass of taxed industries. Therefore, in a generic economy it is not always the case that a mere taxation policy is capable of yielding both an improvement in the growth rate and higher social welfare. However, with a su¢ ciently polarized structure of the quality jumps, there exists a threshold value for ! of taxable industries such that this result can be achieved by taxing up to [0; !]. Interestingly, notice that whether this result holds or not does not depend on the intensity of taxation (that is, on s).
As an illustrative example let us …n d a simple family of economies for which taxation fosters long-run growth. Let us consider a set of economies indexed by i in which, given the industry interval [0; 1], for reasons of tractability we assume that the fraction of industries [0; ! i ] is characterized by identical quality jumps L , while the fraction of industries ( ! i ; 1] is characterized by identical quality jumps H > L (L stands for 'l o w ', H for 'h i g h ') . Each economy i is then distinguishable from the others via the industry ! i separating the set of less innovative industries from the set of more innovative industries. The policy suggested in each economy is that of taxing the set of less innovative industries. We now …n d the set of economies for which taxing the fraction [0; ! i ] of industries raises the growth rate of the economy. Given the new con…guration, (16) becomes
from which we obtain
which essentially tells us that, in order for the long-run growth rate of the economy to be positively a¤ected by the tax policy, the economy must be such that the mass of the less innovative industries to be taxed cannot be higher than !. Notice that, in writing (17) as the solution to the inequality above, we have implicitely assumed that the following condition on the parameters of the model holds (which guarantees that ! i > 0) 10 :
Once again, with a su¢ ciently polarized structure of quality jumps, that is, if H is 's u ¢ ciently higher'than L , a pure taxation directed towards the industries characterized by L has a positive e¤ect both on the steady-state 10 If
, the solution to the inequality would be
Since ! i < 0 is not economically meaningful, fostering growth through a pure taxation policy is impossible. Incidentally notice that the other condition, ! i < 1, is instead always satis…ed.
growth rate of the economy and, given the increase in consumption, on social welfare. As we discussed above, in R&D-driven growth models the market equilibrium is not e¢ cient as the amount of resources devoted to R&D may be too high or too low with respect to the optimal level. As a result, the optimal policy may require either a subsidy or a tax on R&D investment. However, in these models the e¤ect of tax/subsidy activity is ambiguous on social welfare but is usually clear on the long-run growth rate of the economy. A subsidy indeed raises the growth rate while a tax lowers it. Segerstrom (2000) shows that, under certain conditions, this result can be reversed. Our result goes in the same direction but is driven by a di¤erent mechanism. Segerstrom (2000) elaborates on Howitt (1999) , who constructs a model with both vertical and horizontal innovation, in which the scale e¤ect is eliminated while the e¤ect of R&D subsidies on long-run growth is preserved (as opposed to Jones, 1995) . While Howitt (1999) restricts the analysis to an R&D technology where returns from vertical innovation are higher than those from horizontal innovation, Segerstrom (2000) generalizes this model by relaxing this assumption. Moreover, he allows for complexity in research activities to grow at di¤erent speeds. In steady state, given the population growth constraint, a uniform subsidy to both vertical and horizontal research raises (lowers) the quality growth rate by reducing (increasing) the variety growth rate when returns to R&D are higher (lower) in the vertical sector than in the horizontal one. Depending on how strongly the leading-edge quality increases the complexity of research, either of the results will increase the overall growth rate of the economy. For example, if complexity grows relatively fast and the returns from R&D are higher in the vertical sector, a uniform subsidy to R&D lowers the growth rate. The paradox of growth in turn depends on the pace of increasing complexity in research, and on the technology assumed in the vertical and in the horizontal R&D sectors. Our model only considers vertical innovation. It is the asymmetric con…guration of technological parameters (the quality jumps) across industries which is responsible for the paradox of growth. Taxation of the less innovative sectors frees resources which will be partly reallocated to the more innovative ones, thus possibly increasing the growth rate despite the reduction in total research investment. which maximizes steady state welfare. From Subsection 2.5 remember that the value of the instantaneous utility in steady state is given by
and that
Our goal is to …n d the allocation of resources which maximizes steady state welfare, i.e.
where the resource constraint is expressed in per capita terms and we use the de…nition i(!) A(!)l I (!)=k. Solving the integrals we …n d
From the resource constraint we now substitute for C into U to get
Let us now consider the derivative of U with respect to the research intensity in a given industry !
Notice that the partial derivative of the total utility does not depend on the speci…c intensity i(!), and is an increasing function in A(!); (!); (!). Hence, there will exist one industry (denote it by!) characterized by (!); (!) and A(!) such that the partial derivative of total utility with respect to it is always the highest in the economy. This means that, whatever the distribution of resources between consumption and research, it is always the case that welfare can be improved by reallocating research investment towards industry!. In turn, optimality requires i(
At this point it is simple to solve for the optimal level of research intensity i (!): In our economy there is now a single research sector, which implies the following total utility 11 A positive mass of R&D expenditure cannot be concentrated in a zero measure industry. However, the result holds as the limit of a discrete case where! has non-zero measure. Let I be the total amount of resources employed in R&D industries. Industries are indexed over the interval [0; 1] by ! i , with ! i = i=N; i = 0; 1; :::N: Then,
is the frequency of the distribution of research across industries. Since the partial derivative of the total welfare is always bigger for! independently of the frequency of research in that industry, then it has to be that i(! i ) = 0 8! i 6 =!; so that I = P N i=0 i(! i ) (1=N ) = i(!) (1=N ) : If we couple this with the fact that from the de…nition of the integral: lim
In the limit, the frequency distribution of research across industries converges to a Dirac delta density centered in!.
while the new resource constraint is
By substituting for C given in the resource constraint into U, and taking the …r s t order condition we can solve for i(!) and obtain
Given the optimal amount and distribution of research, we can now move on to discuss the subsidy/tax scheme capable of making the market provide the optimal allocation. First we need to turn o¤ research in all industries di¤erent from!: This can be easily accomplished by imposing the tax rate (!) = 1 8! 6 =!. Then we have to look for the value (!) = 1 s(!) such that the market equilibrium intensity is exactly equal to i (!). Solving for the market equilibrium i(!), we obtain
Therefore the optimal subsidy/tax (!) has to be such that s (!) solves
12 The value i(!) is found by imposing the arbitrage condition for industry! and the new resource constraint (18).
Needless to say, the welfare analysis for the simpli…ed version used for the policy analysis in Section 3 is a particular case of the one above, obtained by posing A(!) = A and (!) = . In particular, the social optimum in this case requires that the unique industry where R&D is carried out be exactly the one with the highest quality jump.
Concluding Remarks
In the previous pages we have generalized a standard quality-ladder model with increasing complexity in order to encompass a typical trait of real economies, which is the presence of industries characterized by di¤erent -preference and technological -fundamentals. We have assumed an R&D sector characterized by industry-speci…c quality jumps ( (!)) and arrival rates (A(!)). While the …r s t assumption makes the mark-up charged by each monopolist (and then pro…ts) vary across industries, the second alters the per-industry pro…tability of engaging in R&D. Furthermore, as in the standard case, the consumer's utility is represented by a logarithmic Cobb-Douglas function. However, asymmetric utility contributions ( (!)) of each good are now assumed. The asymmetry in the fundamentals causes prices, market demands and pro…ts to vary across industries. Accordingly, in the stationary equilibrium, an asymmetric composition of actual and expected R&D e¤orts is necessary to make engaging in R&D in each industry equally pro…table. This extension does not alter the comparative statics results obtained in the standard symmetric models.
Our model is also aimed at bringing industrial policy back into the realm of the growth policy debate. We have shown that a policy favoring -either directly or indirectly -industries with higher innovative capacity fosters economic growth and welfare. However, our policy conclusion needs a couple of quali…cations.
First, the actual implementation of the policy recommended requires that the policy-maker be both able and willing to 'p i c k winners'. Our assumption on the ability to recognize winners, at least in an economy where the structure of the quality jumps is time invariant, is indeed not unrealistic. Given the relation between quality jumps and mark-ups, the sectoral distribution of the (!)'s can be easily ascertained. For instance empirical estimates of sectoral markups for U.S. manufacturing can be found in Hall (1988) and more recently in Roeger (1995) and Martin, Scarpetta and Pilat (1996) . Cozzi and Impullitti (2005) have calibrated sectoral quality jumps by using these estimates. The sectoral distribution of the (!)'s is even easier to know, as (!) represents the market share of industry !. Finally A(!) stands for the expected number of innovations per unit of time and per unit of labor. By dividing in each period the number of innovations occurred by the number of researchers in industry !, we can easily obtain an estimate of A(!). Willingness to pick winners can instead be threatened by the presence of lobbies. A policy based on the selection of speci…c industries bears the inevitable risk that the selection criteria be not inspired by economic e¢ ciency and social welfare but rather by the special interests of particular …r m s capable of redirecting the policy maker's intervention in their favor. Second, our model is characterized by full employment in every instant of time. An asymmetric policy intervention strengthens the market selection process of the best industries, inducing an instantaneous and zero-cost reallocation of resources (and, hence, of workers) from one industry to another. In the real world such a process can indeed not only take time, but also be socially painful. There may then be calls for social protection in favor of the (R&D) workers in the declining industries, and more generally for policies aimed at smoothing the shift of workers from those industries to the developing ones. The costs of such interventions should then be taken into account when evaluating the opportunity of implementing the policies recommended.
With these caveats in mind we have shown that market forces do not provide su¢ cient incentives to make agents exploit completely the di¤erences in technological and/or preference fundamentals across industries, and that the policy-maker can (and should) intervene, through a sensible industrial policy, to cure over-investment in poor industries and under-investment in promising ones. We have proven that a zero-cost tax/subsidy policy and, under certain circumstances, even a mere tax policy unambiguously raise growth and welfare above the laissez-faire equilibrium.
A Comparative Statics
Since the zero measure of each industry makes the contribution of the variation of a !-speci…c to C negligible, then d C=d = 0. Analogously d C=d = 0. Then, for any given !
If we de…ne
we can …n a l l y state dL I d < 0 and dL I dn > 0:
